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within forty feet of the Plaintiff's residence. The matters as 
to damages on both the complaint and the counterclaim were dis-
missed by mutual stipulation of the parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant requests the Supreme Court of Utah to 
reverse the decision of the lower court and to rule for the 
Defendant on said summary judgment motions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is admitted that Defendant owned two dogs at the time 
the complaint was filed. Shortly thereafter and for many months 
prior to the decision of the lower court, Defendant owned only 
one dog. This dog was sometimes kept in a pen eighteen (18) feet 
by forty-four (44) feet a portion of which was within forty (40) 
feet of an occupied dwelling owned by the Plaintiff. All other 
allegations of Plaintiff's complaint and affidavits are denied 
both in Defendant's answer and in Defendant's affidavit in support 
of her motion for summary judgment. 
In addition, there are facts in dispute as for example 
Plaintiff's claim that Defendants maintained said dogs as a 
commercial establishment; however, no proof was ever offered to 
establish this and Plaintiff's affidavit says merely that "she 
has been informed of efforts by the Defendants to establish" such 
this in the face of Defendant's denials of anything other than 
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that the dog or dogs were household pets. In any event, Defen-
dant does not believe that the lower Court considered any of the 
disputed matters in rendering its decision but considered only 
the fact that Defendant did have a dog or at one time two dogs 
which was occasionally maintained in a pen within forty feet of 
a dwelling. If the Court did consider these disputed matters, 
that would be error because not only did the allegations of Plain-
tiff's affidavit and complaint constitute mere assertions without 
any support, but these would be matters for a trier of fact to 
determine in any event. It should also be pointed out with re-
spect to the facts that although there was reference in Plaintiff's 
complaint to problems relating to droppings, barking, fouling of 
the air and the like, there was no evidence in the form of affi-
davit or otherwise before the Court respecting said assertions, 
and likewise these would be questions of fact for a trier of fact 
in any event. 
It is stipulated that the property lies within zoning 
R-2-10H. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT SECTION 
22-2-16, REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, PROHIBIT THE 
CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The ordinance in question provides as follows: 
No animals or fowl shall be kept or maintained closer than 
forty (40) feet from any dwelling, and no barn, stable, 
coop, pen or corral shall be kept closer than forty (40) 
feet from any street, except that in Residential Zone R-3L 
no corral or stable for the keeping of horses may be located 
closer to a public street or to any dwelling than one hun-
dred (100) feet. 
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If one takes the first sentence of the above ordinance 
literally, then almost everyone in Salt Lake County is in viola-
tion of it; and it would appear that that is what would follow 
from the lower Court's ruling since admittedly a dog is an animal 
and admittedly it is within forty feet of a dwelling. Actually, 
human beings are also part of "animals", and they are maintained 
in dwellings. This is not intended to be facetious, but merely 
to illustrate that the word animal depending on its context and 
purpose of the particular writing, may have different definitions. 
Because a dog is obviously an animal doesn't mean they have to be 
kept more than forty feet away from a dwelling. Obviously, the 
ordinance has reference to those animals generally referred to as 
livestock. Notice that the rest of the sentence refers to barns, 
stables, coops, pens and corrals. This ordinance could hardly 
be used to prevent a homeowner from keeping a canary in his kitchen, 
and yet if applied the way the lower Court did in this case, that 
is the result that follows. 
Fortunately, there are other enactments which lend some 
assistance in interpreting Section 22-2-16 the way the defendant 
suggests above. Under the applicable zoning, R-2-10H, Section 
22-19-2(4) permits the keeping of "household pets, the keeping 
of not more than four horses for private use only and not for 
rental". Section 22-1-6(38) defines household pets as "animals 
and/or fowl ordinarily permitted in the house and kept for com-
pany or pleasure such as dogs, cats, and canaries, including not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
more than two (2) dogs or two (2) cats over four (4) months of 
age and not more than a total of four (4) animals. Household 
pets does not include inherently or potentially dangerous animals, 
fowls, or reptiles." This definition is very enlightening in that 
it discusses the fact that there would be different types of ani-
mals, i.e. refers to animals or fowl ordinarily permitted in the 
house or kept for company or pleasure such as dogs etc. Is De-
fendant asking too much to say that Section 22-2-16 is also de-
scriptive of a particular group of animals, which group in fact 
excludes those defined in Section 22-1-6(38) as household pets. 
Although it is not entirely clear from the lower Court's 
ruling, some of the conversation that took place at the time of 
the hearing indicated that the lower Court may have felt that be-
cause the Defendant's dog comes under the definition of a permitted 
household pet, it would be permissible to have the dog within forty 
feet of a residence including the Defendant's residence, and in 
fact inside Defendant's residence as long as it was not maintained 
in a separate pen, any portion of which was within forty feet of 
a dwelling. In other words, the lower court seemed to say that 
it was permissible to have the dog run loose in the entire yard 
of the Defendant so long as it was not penned in a dog run a por-
tion of which was within forty feet of Plaintiff's dwelling. This 
argument is unsound because all it really says is that if your pen 
is as big as your whole yard it is lawful even though the dog may 
come within one or two feet of a dwelling, and in the instance 
case, within approximately eight feet of the Plaintiff's dwelling. 
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But how does that get around the ordinance? The dog is still an 
animal and his pen is still within forty feet of the plaintiff's 
dwelling and he is still kept or maintained in it. Obviously, 
there is really only two ways to interpret the ordinance: The 
Court must interpret it literally and then everyone who has a 
canary or kitten must keep them forty feet away from their own 
home as well as their neighbors homes, or the court must accept 
the interpretation described above that just as in Section 22-1-6(38) 
where household pets are described as a particular type of ani-
mal, Section 22-2-16 also refers to a particular type of animal 
which does not include household pets i.e. dogs, etc. Another 
reason to adopt the interpretation suggested by the defendant is 
that to hold to the language literally would completely annihilate 
the other sections quoted relating to the permitting of household 
i 
pets in and around homes. Defendant is informed that these sec-
tions were enacted after the ordinance in questionf therefore 
believes they should be given greater effect. 
CONCLUSION 
The granting of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
was in error and should be reversed. Defendant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on her motion for summary judgment. 
T Respectfully submitted, 
Inagene D. Shipley, Pro se 
Defendant and Appellant 
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